

Military Government

Weekly

Information Bulletin



OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT (U. S. ZONE)
UNITED STATES FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER

REPORTS AND INFORMATION BRANCH

UNITED STATES ZONE, GERMANY

Greater Hesse, Württemberg-Baden



MILITARY GOVERNMENT

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MILITARY GOVERNMENT LETTERS AND INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED RECENTLY

Arrest and Detention — Germany 2 February 1946
AG 250.3 GEC-AGO

Amendment to letter, "Removal of Nazis and Militarists in
the German Reichspost," Dated 20 Nov 1945, same file
number 4 February 1946
AG 014.1 GEC-AGO

Review of Cases of Detention by Security Review Boards . . 4 February 1946
AG 013.3 GEC-AGO

Changes No. 8, Volume I, ETO-SOP No. 29-Civilian Labor 4 February 1946

Military Government Regulations 7 February 1946
(2 Inclosures: Mil Govt Law No 55 and German Translation) AG 014.1 GEC-AGO

Privileges of Soviet Liaison Officers in Displaced Persons
Camps Other Than Wholly Soviet 7 February 1946
AG 383.7-3 GEC-DP
AGO

Control Council Order No. 2, Confiscation and Surrender
of Arms and Ammunition 12 February 1946

Extracts from a report of the Office of the Military Governor have been combined with selections from the Seventh Army I and E Newsletter to picture the potential security danger of the black market and the efforts to combat it through rigid price control.

Can A Potentially Dangerous Focus of Resistance Be Eliminated By Price Control?

If the Germans should begin a resistance movement the black market would be the logical place to begin. The organization for a resistance movement would be ready. And the same unscrupulous persons who today are engaged in the illegal procurement and sale of necessities would be in a position to procure guns and ammunition for those who might want to use them against the occupation armies.

When the black market takes on the character of a business, like any business it requires organization. Since the black market is illegal business the organization must be clandestine. Sources of supply must be kept hidden from the eyes of the civilian and military police, ways of transporting illicit commodities without being intercepted must be devised, dependable confederates must be found and disciplined in the manners of defying the authorities, and finally the goods must be disposed of in secret. This organization and illicit communication is the primary requisite for concerted subversive activity.

As a matter of fact, the French Resistance movement, which gave so much trouble to the Germans, was inextricably intertwined with the black market in France. Its traffic in arms and

ammunition, or in individuals wanted by the German authorities, its experience in the evasion or corruption of guards, its extended communications, and similar characteristics made the black market organization in France during the German occupation of that country a desirable thing — from the point of view of the Allies.

PETTY TRADING

At present the German civilian black market deals generally in necessities and has not reached the large scale proportions where professional lawbreakers go into such activity for the sake of huge profits. Under conditions of commodity scarcity it is natural for some unscrupulous persons to engage in black market activity. Farmers may keep their produce from the channels authorized to provide city-dwellers with food in order to get higher prices elsewhere. Meat dealers may pretend to have no stocks on hand at the same time that, in violation of rationing and price regulations, they offer extra cuts to those who can afford steep prices.

By and large, the German who trades in the black market today does so in order to supplement his authorized food or clothing ration, to get some gas or

tobacco or other commodity which is scarce or virtually non-existent in his authorized market, or to turn an occasional profit in a commodity he happens at a particular time to have more of than he needs.

THREAT TO MISSION

From infractions such as these the black market can mushroom into a big business. Profiteers go into it on a large scale and undertake to supply disreputable distributors with the scarce commodities. The profits are huge. The only problems are getting the merchandise and not getting caught.

MG must therefore maintain a careful watch on black market activity. From small beginnings the illicit traffic can grow into a highly organized big business, similar to the bootlegging industry in the United States during prohibition. If it should do so, the black market would become a definite threat to the security of our forces and mission in Germany.

At the moment our position is the same in certain respects as that of the Germans who occupied France. MG is the occupation authority and is determined to execute certain policies of its own. It cannot afford to let any obstacle arise to the accomplishment of our mission here, especially such a potentially dangerous force as the black market.

The situation surrounding the level of prices and the value of the Reichsmark is confused and contradictory. No official price indices have been calculated since the end of 1944, although provision recently has been made by Military Government for a resumption of price index studies. Direct observation, however, gives abundant indication that there are in the three Länder of the U. S. Zone two entirely separate levels of prices: Controlled prices and black market prices.

The field of controlled prices includes most rationed foods and most across-the-counter transactions in other items.

Here, prices are still generally around the same levels they were when the German Price Stop order went into effect in 1936, plus the increase of about 10 per cent in the price level which had occurred up to the end of 1944.

In terms of a rough estimate of the purchasing power parity of the pre-war Reichsmark and the pre-war dollar, this level of prices gave the Reichsmark a purchasing power of roughly 30 to 35 cents in 1939. There was some additional rise of the controlled German price level during 1945, although permitted price increases have been negligible. There also has been quality deterioration. By July 1945, according to the U. S. Department of Commerce "Survey of Current Business," the purchasing power of the dollar also had fallen from the 1935-39 level by 21 per cent as measured by retail food prices. For controlled prices, then, the Reichsmark today still may be said to have a purchasing power of roughly 35 cents. This is proven by using the 35 cent purchasing power parity rate in converting controlled Reichsmark prices into dollars. The calculation yields dollar and cent prices which are not out of line with the prices of the listed articles in the United States.

COMPARATIVE PRICES

On the black market, the situation today is entirely different. Reichsmarks are being disposed of at prices which represent a drastic devaluation from pre-war value. There is no single rate of depreciation. Each person discounts his stock of Reichsmarks at his own estimate of their present and future value. There are, in effect, many rates of discount, many values of the Reichsmark. Commodities on the black market command from 10 to 100 times the legal prices. It is virtually impossible to compute the black market price level from the many isolated, illegal transactions. However, typical black market prices chosen at

random from field reports, and compared with typical dollar prices for the same commodity, show a calculated purchasing power value of the Reichsmark on the black market of about two cents. A comparison between legal and typical black market prices in the U. S. Zone is shown in Figure 1.

In spite of the increase in the pressures operating against the controlled price level and legal prices, the line still is being held in the U.S. Zone. For one thing, the sense of catastrophe, the desperate atmosphere of Berlin, is weaker in the predominantly agricultural regions of Bavaria, Württemberg-Baden and Greater Hesse. In addition, the German Price Control offices have been retained, reactivated and restaffed, and are now beginning to operate in the U. S. Zone.

The importance of maintaining price controls is recognized thoroughly by the German price authorities in the U. S. Zone, who are cooperating wholeheartedly with the Military Government program. They have made free use of press and radio to awaken an apathetic public to the prime importance of maintaining legal price ceilings. They are still hampered in the effectiveness of their work by inadequacies of staff, by untrained personnel, and by a lack of transportation. There was, of course, a loss of experienced personnel as a necessary accompaniment of the denazification pro-




Fig. 1. Comparison of US Zone Prices

gram. Since the occupation, some 465 price control officials have been removed from office.

Reported violations and fines have risen in all three sectors of the U. S. Zone during the last few months. As indicated in the accompanying table, Greater Hesse presented the heaviest increases.

Penalties for price violation have averaged a little under RM 600 per violation. Grave doubts have been expressed by German price officials as to efficacy of monetary fines in view of the tremendous profits made in the black market. Other penalties for price violation are suspension of license for a given period, closing of establishment and imprisonment. Recently it has been agreed that, in future,

these penalties will be invoked more regularly in place of the former reliance upon fines.

Price violations in late 1945 occurred most frequently in food, rent and transportation, as shown in Figure 2.

SMALL INCREASES PERMITTED

Despite the flood of black market transactions and the tremendous pressures on legal prices, the price formation offices give serious consideration to requests for price increases but have held permitted increases to a minimum. Each application for a price change must be supported by cost and financial data

which are analyzed carefully in accordance with the authorized criteria for price adjustments.

INFLATION POTENTIAL

It is indicative of the present contradictory price situation that while some firms probably resort entirely to barter as a basis for sales, others continue to file applications for price increases involving relatively small adjustments above the 1936 fixed level of prices. Similarly, German officials who spend most of their time combatting black markets, where prices changes are quoted in 50 and 100 Reichsmark units, remain conservative and strict to an extreme in granting permitted price increases of a few Reichsmarks or even Pfennigs.

Doubtless one of the main reasons why the German officials are so eager to combat black market activity is their recollection of the desperate economic situation in Germany in 1919-1923. During this period Germany underwent a terrible inflation. In 1919 the aggregate German currency amounted to 41 billion marks. The next four years witnessed an unparalleled rise in prices, reaching in the final phase an extreme such that people were paid literally in bales of money, all of it practically worthless. By 1923, although the total issue of Ger-

man currency was almost 75 billions of marks, the actual value of this gigantic sum on the dollar exchange was only 722 million gold marks. Here is how these figures look when placed together for contrast:

Issue currency:

RM 74,954,803,000,000,000,000

Actual value (what it

would buy): RM 722,000,000

Inflation has been defined as an abnormal increase in the quantity of purchasing power, accompanied by a fall in the value of money, per unit. It may be brought about by any of a number of factors, or by a combination of them. The introduction of a great deal of newly printed currency, which is not backed by anything, can bring it about. Loss of confidence in the existing currency can bring it about. In periods of scarcity such as the present, if prices are permitted to rise without restriction, inflationary effects will also be felt.


The significant thing about the definition of inflation given above is the phrase, "fall in the value of money per unit." A piece of currency is really worth what it can be exchanged for, what it will buy.

Uncontrolled inflation, as judged by the experience of Germany, is a sure way to wreck the economic organization of

Increase in Black Market Violations and Fines (U. S. Zone)

Land	No. of reported violations			Number of Fines			Amount of Fines (in Reichsmarks)		
	Sep	Oct	Nov	Sep	Oct	Nov	Sep	Oct	Nov
Total	1,828	3,281	4,107	782	1,996	2,640	551,477	1,000,426	1,542,391
Bavaria	917	1,453	2,101	338	897	1,288	182,029	511,544	519,113
Württemberg-Baden	729	1,343	1,344	270	707	873	179,323	281,725	496,377
Greater Hesse	182	485	662	174	392	479	190,125	207,157	526,901

WURTTENBERG-BADEN



a country. Once started, the inflationary tendency tendency snowballs. Everyone loses.

The government loses because of the time interval between tax assessment and collection during which money continues to decline. The fixed income group — civil servants, teachers, pensioners, fixed income investment owners — loses because their set incomes decline in purchasing power. Wage earners lose because wage and salary raises always lag behind price rises, and also because of lowered purchasing power.

In the beginning inflation does not affect the willingness of people to hold money. But as soon as they discover what is happening they try to protect themselves by getting rid of the money they have as soon as possible in anticipation of price rises. They seek to buy


goods. But those who have goods are reluctant to sell, preferring to hold "real" articles of any sort.

On a national scale, the aggregate of saving declines. National income declines. There is general insecurity. The upshot is a wrecked economy and a tottering or fallen government.

At the present time, there is a mounting problem of absenteeism, and the need for a stronger incentive to work is a principal reason for the necessary anti-inflation program. People are still working at the controlled wage rates which form the counterpart of the controlled price level. But if, or as, the distinction between

the two price orbits and food distribution through legal channels breaks down, the first sign of such real inflation will be the disappearance of the incentive to work at controlled rates. If such a situation is permitted to remain uncorrected, for however short a time, panic is apt to result. Mass exodus from employment,

BAVARIA



GREATER HESSE




Fig. 2. Price Violations By Type in US Zone

frantic efforts to convert increasingly valueless cash into tangible goods, widespread hunger, and even rioting are not unlikely concomitants.

BERLIN PRICES HIGHER

In the City of Berlin, the price control situation is entirely different from that in the U.S. Zone. With the exception of food, most Berlin prices are already considerably out of line with those in the U. S. Zone. U.S. Military Government directives on price control do not apply to Berlin, nor even to the U.S. Sector of Berlin. Berlin price policy is formulated by the Allied Kommandatura, a quadripartite council.

The German municipal officials activated a Price Office in July 1945 on the basis of an ordinance approved by the Kommandatura. Establishment of a Committee was authorized to formulate general policies of price formation and price supervision. The Price Supervision Section includes a Price Examining Service made up of economic experts, price auditors and examiners. One hundred men in the Police Department are also engaged in price supervision and price police work.

There is one important difference between the policies in effect in Berlin and in the U.S. Zone. In the Zone, all former laws and regulations on prices were continued in force after elimination of discriminatory Nazi features. Although the Berlin Price Office is said to retain the powers and responsibilities of the former

Price Formation and Price Supervision Offices, the Berlin Price Ordinance merely fixes the prices of daily necessities, scarce consumer commodities and vital services at the level of 1 April 1945. At that time, prices were at the same level in Berlin and in Southern Germany, so that under this ordinance, controlled prices in Berlin have continued at the same general level as those in the Zone.

A departure of great significance has been made from the usual German price system. In Berlin, it has been decided to yield to the pressures and to allow new realistic prices on consumer goods other than foods and vital services.

In Berlin, therefore, there are three separate levels of prices. Only rationed food prices and a few services are strictly controlled and have remained in line with controlled prices in the U. S. Zone. At the other extreme, the black market, despite efforts by the occupying authorities to abolish it, still flourishes. Some black market prices are almost unbelievable; all

are much higher than in the U. S. Zone. In the middle bracket, there is the third group of prices, peculiar to Berlin, consisting of the prices openly marked and charged in retail establishments other than food stores. These are not black market prices. They are legitimate, and arise out of a different concept of price administration on the part of the Berlin municipal price authorities. Whereas black market prices in Berlin




Fig. 3. December 1945 Berlin Prices

are one to several hundred times higher than the former legal prices, these intermediate legitimate prices lie in a range roughly from two to ten times the old legal levels.

The prices of rationed food in Berlin remain directly in line with wartime levels. Even the scarcest items in the Berliner's food budget, meat and fat, are available at prices which are still completely in line with a Reichsmark having a 35 cent purchasing power. A recent survey of permitted food prices in Berlin showed no significant changes between 1 April and the end of the year, and no significant variation between these Berlin prices and the present legal prices in the U.S. Zone.

In Berlin, the black market Reichsmark has an average value ranging from one-tenth of a cent to slightly above one cent. That is, in the Berlin black market the Reichsmark has perhaps one-tenth the value that it has in the U.S. Zone. Recently quoted prices indicate the special character of Berlin's black market, as shown in Figure 3.

BIG STORES REOPENING

Some trade has been restored in Berlin, in comparison with the complete black-out of business which prevailed at the beginning of the occupation. Not only food stores but other retail stores of all types have re-opened, although stocks are limited. They include the big department stores with famous names like Wertheim and Emil Koester, fashionable specialty shops on Kurfürstendamm and a multitude of small shops.

One of the strictly enforced rules of the Berlin Price Office is the requirement

that all retail prices be clearly and conspicuously posted. Food stores show a complete list of all prices charged; other retail stores mark each commodity. These posted retail commodity prices disclose at once the new, intermediate German price level. Kitchen utensils, selling at legal prices of about RM 2 in the U.S. Zone, are on sale now in Berlin and are crudely manufactured out of former war materials, for RM 8 to RM 16. Men's woolen winter jackets, formerly priced at about RM 25, are now to be seen in the better stores, made of dyed, restored Wehrmacht uniforms, and marked at RM 59.

Roughly computed on a purchasing power parity basis, the Reichsmark appears to have a value of between 10 and 20 cents in this special, intermediate Berlin price orbit. Taking into account quality changes, the extent of the real price rise is considerably greater. The goods of recent manufacture are shoddy and unfinished and would mostly be quite unsaleable in the United States.

This new intermediate price level in Berlin has tremendous significance for the future of price control in Germany. The black market might be eliminated by strong control measures, further restoration of minimum economic activity and necessary financial and monetary measures. But if present efforts to consider Germany as an economic unit are followed and meet greater success, the occupying authorities will be faced with the serious problem of determining how prices will be integrated between Berlin and the rest of Germany and which level of prices will become the future overall level.

Farben Securities Transfer

Prohibited by New MG Law No. 55

Despite CC Law No. 9 of last November ordering seizure, control and destruction of the plants and property of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., and vesting title in the Control Council, securities of the former chemical trust have figured prominently in German stock market transactions.

With the issuance of MG Law No. 55, prohibiting all transactions in Farben securities, MG offers further proof to the Germans that the Potsdam Agreement concerning demobilization of war industries will be strictly executed.

Effective January 29, 1946, Farben securities of all description may no longer be bought, sold, exchanged, transferred, loaned, mortgaged, bartered or delivered in the U.S. Zone. Transactions violating the prohibition are null and void.

Violations or attempts at evasion will be prosecuted in either German or MG courts. Punishment will be by fine not exceeding RM 100,000, or by imprisonment up to five years, or both.

Railway Fare

Standard fare will be paid by all military personnel riding German civilian passenger trains in the U.S. Zone, USFET instructs. Travel warrants may be obtained upon presentation of competent U.S. Army orders, however.

Sale of Clothing

Civilians leaving the employ of the U.S. Army may retain Army clothing and

equipment if necessary to prevent hardship, states a recent change in SOP on civilian labor. The clothing must be dyed to conform with pre-existing provisions, and paid for by wage deductions.

Clothing and equipment may also be issued, when necessary, to static laborers upon Regional Labor Office approval. Neither of these provisions, however, is to be interpreted as authority to sell or issue new clothing prior to discharge.

Arms and Ammo

The period of immunity from prosecution for carrying arms and ammunition has been extended from 0001 hours, 7 Jan 1946, to 2400 hours, 21 Jan, USFET ruled in clarifying the effect of Control Council Order No. 2.

The order dealing with confiscation and surrender of arms and ammunition stated in part that carrying, concealment or ownership of arms or ammunition would not be considered an offense if they were surrendered to the nearest Allied military commander within 10 days of the publication of the order.

Control Council Order No. 2 was signed on 7 Jan and published at 1800 hours 11 Jan, at which time the 10-day period allowed for surrender began. This period ended 21 Jan. A person found with arms or ammunition during the 10-day period is, therefore, not subject to prosecution since the allowed time for compliance had not elapsed. The arms, however, are subject to confiscation.

A person found with arms or ammunition between 7 Jan and the date of publication, 11 Jan, is not subject to prosecution for he, too, has not been given the opportunity to surrender such materials in accordance with the above-mentioned instructions.

Persons whose arms or ammunition were seized either prior to, or after the expiration of, the period of immunity may be prosecuted. Those persons who surrendered arms or ammunition or whose arms or ammunition were discovered during the period of immunity may not be prosecuted.

Abandonment or delivery of arms or ammunition to another individual is not surrender to an Allied officer and will not provide immunity from prosecution.

Medical Supplies

The turnover of certain quantities of captured German medical supplies for Military Government use has been authorized by USFET.

These supplies will be handed over to Military Government after consolidated requisitions to meet six months medical supply requirements for displaced persons and civilian internees in the U.S. Zone have been filled.

The outstanding requisitions for displaced persons and civilian internees in the U.S. Zone of Austria also will be met before the turnover to German civilians is accomplished.

Black Will Be Worn

Effective 12 Feb all outer clothing of German POWs will be dyed black, instructs a War Department cable. POWs already on the way to the ETO are wearing undyed German national uniforms.

Automatic Arrest

Four groups of persons whose detention was formerly mandatory have been removed from automatic arrest categories,

according to a recently-released USFET directive.

The groups are: (1) the German intelligence services; (2) all officials down to and including the rank of oberst (colonel) in the Kriminalpolizei (Kripo or Criminal Police); (3) higher police officials; and (4) civil servants.

These are no longer automatic arrest categories because such individuals are not being indicted at the Nürnberg trials. This does not call for an immediate release from detention for the personnel of the groups concerned but rather means that their cases now can be reviewed.

Persons held in the mandatory arrest categories are being detained without benefit of a review of their cases. They will continue to be confined under such conditions until precedents for disposing of cases in their classification are set at Nürnberg. Then they will face either a German civilian or a U.S. military court.

The automatic arrest categories now include personnel of the Gestapo and SD, para-military organizations, leadership corps of the Nazi party, the Reich cabinet, the General Staff and the High Command of the German armed forces, war criminals and security suspects.

Here is the latest detailed list of automatic arrest categories.

The Gestapo and the SD.

- (1) All personnel of the Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo or Secret State Police).
- (2) All personnel of the Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsführers-SS (commonly known as the SD).

Note: "All personnel" as used in subpars. (1) and (2) above includes personnel working in the national headquarters and in the departments, offices, branches.

Para-Military Organizations.

- (1) Waffen-SS (Armed SS) — All officers and NCOs down to and including the rank of Scharführer, all

ranks of Totenkopfverbände (TV, or Death's Head Formations) and all SS-Helferinnen or SS-Kriegshelferinnen (SS Female Auxiliaries).

- (2) Allgemeine SS (General SS) — All officers and NCOs down to and including the rank of Unterscharführer and all SS-Helferinnen or SS-Kriegshelferinnen.
- (3) Sturm-Abteilung (SA, or Storm Troops) — All officers down to and including the rank of Sturmbannführer.

Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party.

- (1) Administrative officials of the party down to and including the post of Amtsleiter at Kreis level and all Ortsgruppenleiter.
- (2) All members of the party down to and including the rank of Obergemeinschaftsleiter.

Reich Cabinet (Die Reichsregierung).

- (1) The German government (Die Reichsregierung) including any persons who at any time since 30 January have been:
 - (a) Reich ministers, with or without portfolio (the heads of departments or ministries of the central government); state ministers acting as Reich ministers; and other officials entitled to take part in meetings of the "Ordinary Cabinet."
 - (b) Members of the Council of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich (Ministerrat für die Reichsverteidigung).
 - (c) Members of the Secret Cabinet Council (Geheimer Kabinettsrat)

General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces.

- (1) All individuals who between February 1938 and May 1945 held the following appointments:
 - (a) Commander in Chief of the Navy (Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine).

- (b) Chief of Naval War Staff (Chef der Seekriegsleitung and formerly, Chef des Stabes der Seekriegsleitung).
- (c) Commander in Chief of the Army (Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres).
- (d) Chief of the General Staff of the Army (Chef des Generalstabes des Heeres).
- (e) Commander in Chief of the Air Force (Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe).
- (f) Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force (Chef des Generalstabes der Luftwaffe).
- (g) Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces (Chef des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht).
- (h) Chief of the Operations Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces (Chef des Führungsstabes des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht).
- (i) Deputy Chief of the Operations Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces (Stellvertreter des Chef des Führungsstabes des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht).
- (j) Commanders-in-Chief in the field with the status of Oberbefehlshaber, of the Wehrmacht, Navy, Army, Air Force.

- (2) All individuals who were at any time General Staff Corps officers (Generalstabsoffiziere) either Army (Heer) or Air Force (Luftwaffe).

f. *War Criminals.* Individuals on the War Crimes List of the United Nations War Crimes Commission or on any other official list of war criminals, or against whom specific evidence is available as to their participation in atrocities or war crimes.

g. *Security Suspects.* All persons concerning whom there are reasonable grounds to believe that their continued freedom would endanger the security of the occupation forces or the objectives of Military Government.

Forgive Us Our Trespasses....

During my trip through Germany I had the opportunity to talk again with my former friends and to renew the contacts which the war had broken. The belief which I had held before that the German people were never a unified block supporting Hitler, despite the claims made by the propaganda machine of Goebbels, was fully confirmed. There were large groups of people who, during the entire period, answered with a definite "no." Although they committed no acts against the regime, nevertheless they made no secret of their attitude, despite the unimaginable terror which threatened them daily. They never capitulated.

First of all, then, the church. In Catholic and Protestant circles alike appeared the same courageous acts, performed by those who, as the clearly recognized exponents of the resistance, never once made a single concession. This united front brought the two confessions much closer together on the plane of humanity rather than dogma. However, the Protestant side of the picture is much less unified than the Catholic.

INTERNAL CONFLICTS

Only in Prussia was there open warfare. There the German Christians were able to mobilize for themselves all church property and assets and, above all, the police and other state agencies; and the Confessional Church was forced to organize in opposition. In Bavaria, Württemberg and elsewhere, the Confessional Church did not split with the state church organization. It was forced however to fight against appeasers who believed that in order to save the church

and the confession they would at least outwardly have to give in to the nazis. This tension was relieved only by the conference at Treysa (August 1945) where the resolution was adopted mak-

Under the above title the eminent Swiss theologian, Karl Barth, has examined the question of German war guilt in an article which originally appeared in the Zurich publication "Die Weltwoche," and was republished in several German papers in the American Zone. Karl Barth was professor of theology in various German universities for years before the nazi regime and also during its first years. He has made an extensive tour through Germany since the beginning of the occupation. According to the "Weser-Kurier" which reprinted the article, Barth believes that the Germany of 1946 stands in greater need of understanding friends than of reformers and educators. Therefore, it is felt, his words will carry greater weight with the German public than would be the case if his attitude were less sympathetic.

ing the 78 year old Bishop Wurm of Württemberg the head of the German church. During the war, Bishop Wurm had turned further and further away from national socialism. By making several daring appeals to Hitler he had come very close to the concentration camp. Pastor Niemöller was selected as his assistant and vice-president. The Confessional Church thereby became the officially recognized church instead of merely an opposition group.

In any case, one lesson should clearly result from these groupings — a lesson equally applicable to the German people as a whole: This war and tyranny was never that type of acid test which clearly

separates the contesting spiritual factors. To be sure, a not unimportant number of courageous people held out in the opposition. But weak-principled persons in good positions were also able by compromise to live through the period of oppression. The German political priest is not dead.

I have learned to recognize the universities as the second center of resistance. At Freiburg, Marburg, and Bonn I met groups of courageous professors in all fields. Philosophers, scientists, historians, lawyers, under the cover of regimentation have cherished the principles of humanity and passed it on to their students as well.

LABOR AND THE CHURCH

Thirdly, labor should be mentioned in this connection. I talked to two communists in Frankfurt, who carried on their illegal activity during the entire period of oppression. The communist party was, too, the only political group which was able to emerge as a unit immediately after the collapse because it had a complete underground organization. One can also notice a very significant change in the attitude of the communists towards the church. The fact that they were together with the German priests in the concentration camps has brought about a kind of understanding with the church. Although they still maintain their old atheistic beliefs, this represents a significant change in ideological evaluation. Content is no longer as important as the equivalent intrinsic quality, which is able to bridge the gulf even between the most extreme opponents.

FUNDAMENTAL IDEOLOGY

In view of these opposition groups, therefore, one should get out of the habit of dubbing all Germans nazis. The Swiss simply lacks the imagination for understanding what a terror of such enormity was able to do. The constant awareness

of living with one foot in the grave must, in the course of years, result in paralysis. Among hundreds of Germans there is not one who would not agree in a minute, that Hitler was both the devil and the fool in one. If one charges them with having certainly thought differently during the great victories in 1940, he will learn that even during that triumphant spring many people suffered terribly. Only after the attack on Russia did the opposition circles breathe more easily, because in it they saw the hope of final defeat.

As long as one talks with the Germans only about Hitler, the real discussion has not yet begun. The core will be reached only when the discussion advances to Bismarck. When the national socialist facade has crumbled, most Germans, even many who were active in the resistance movement, reveal the solid structure of German nationalism beneath. They do not understand that national socialism was nothing else but the last, inevitable result of the Bismarck policy, which forcefully unified Germany with blood and iron into a national socialistic, capitalistic, and imperialistic empire, and thereby became the murderer of the vital freedom of 1848.

GERMANS GUILTY

There is no doubt about the de facto guilt of the German people. Also, it is significant that the bombing attacks caused absolutely no feeling of hatred. They were taken as an offender would accept his sentence — with resignation and regret, as just retribution for a deed committed. Today the main problem is to qualify correctly de jure this de facto guilt. Is it the guilt of Maidenek? Is it the guilt of Hitler? One can make the Germans recognize the guilt in their way of thinking which made possible Maidenek and Hitler.

It is striking, how little footing the national socialistic ideology of Rosenberg actually gained. I am also convinced that

the German youth, which many people believe is incurably infected, will not long remain under its influence. National socialistic school teachers will react no differently from all school teachers. Life and experience cover schoolroom wisdom till finally nothing is left. The Allies have perhaps not yet grasped how to start this great task of reeducation. They still try to accomplish it by radio speeches and films which are supposed to instruct the German people. Only one thing will really help, one's own example. A better philosophy of life should not be offered by words, but by the example of actual living.

As to the question of the existential guilt, I see in it a great danger for the German. The religious German inclines to escape his political obligations by burying himself in deep religiousness. It is significant that there was a lot of talk about demons at the theological conferences which I visited. "We have looked Satan in the eye." Such sentences were spoken almost enthusiastically. To oppose the demonized world, the sacrament offered help, comfort, and deliverance; and liturgy, likewise, prayer and response. For a time I listened to all this. Finally I could no longer remain silent. "Aren't you thereby in danger of falling into a world of magic?" I asked my friends. "Why do you always talk about demons? Why don't you say it correctly: We were political fools."

The Swiss attitude of self-righteousness is just as dangerous for them as is for the German the tendency earnestly to acknowledge his guilt after committing the most incredible sins. This is clear from the parable of the Pharisee and the Publican. The former sticks to a smug godliness; the latter however beats his breast and pleads: "God be merciful to

me, a sinner." And, the story continues, he thereupon entered his house feeling that he had justified himself before the other.

THE NIEMÖLLER STORY

Niemöller was never the glorious martyr he was considered here in Switzerland. He is neither a philosopher nor a dogmatist, but a person of contradictions and resentments. Together with constant Christian firmness in the fight for the pure religion, his make-up includes a German nationalistic outlook. But I am convinced that the unfortunate interview, which also cost me a sleepless night, is due on one hand to a misunderstanding by Dorothy Thompson, and on the other to bad preparation by Niemöller. Picture the situation: He had just been liberated at the Brenner Pass and hoped to be able to return to his family at the earliest opportunity, when the Americans dragged him to Naples and Capri for a "vacation" in a sort of golden prison. Then, when journalists tried to "squeeze" him, this impulsive and confused personality lost his temper. In order to vex the Americans, he showed himself as a regular U-boat captain. Niemöller clearly expressed himself against national socialism at the conference of the "Bruderat," however, and there he also acknowledged Christian socialism.

I believe the discussion that has developed in Switzerland about the interview is a very regrettable affair. Persons have expressed themselves on the matter who are made of exactly the same cloth as the German national socialists. They are ideological fanatics who live from moral fragments, who have a very spluttery way of thinking, and who are not worthy of lacing Niemöller's shoes.



General Eisenhower's Demobilization Policies Praised

Radio commentators without exception lauded General Eisenhower for his demobilization talk before a joint session of Congress. It was felt his factual talk had immensely clarified the picture. Typical comments follow:



Max Lerner (MBS): "As for demobilization . . . it takes General Eisenhower's bigness to bring some order into it . . . protests . . . quitted . . . soldiers believe in (him)" . . . **Cecil Brown (MBS):** "These remarks (General Eisenhower's assertion no one is more interested than he in GI's welfare) . . . accepted by most soldiers . . . burned up at . . . demobilization; for Eisenhower is a hero to the men in American Army, and his concern for their welfare . . . accepted by nation as a whole" . . . **H. R. Baukhage (ABC):** "General Eisenhower's . . . answers stopped the questioners right in their tracks" . . . **Frank Singiser (MBS):** . . . "General Eisenhower heading for unique place in American history . . . not since George Washington . . . any military leader . . . more effective on the speaker's platform." . . . **Edward R. Murrow (CBS):** "...full, detailed spellout of the demobilization situation . . . General . . . has clear-headed view of the political tasks we face in world-affairs."

MAKE OCCUPATION ATTRACTIVE

Gabriel Heatter expresses the opinion that: "Occupation is more than a job of watching Germany and Japan. Make it a career; tell . . . how the Germans fooled everybody after 1918 . . . where we fell down, why we can't fall

down again, why the price would be another war. Make it attractive financially, too, (for all); make room for (all) to grow."

UNRRA DECISION

From **H. A. Kaltenborn** comes the view that **Herbert Lehman**, UNRRA head, was wise in deciding to reject the demand for resignation of General Morgan, UNRRA chief in Germany and, instead, inviting him to Washington for a conference on the displaced persons problem.

POLES AND YUGOSLAVS

Elmer Davis of ABC broadcast last night that "These particular Poles and Yugoslavs (armed by the American Army of Occupation in Germany) can't or won't go home. They're opposed to their home governments — which are under Russian influence — so actively opposed that they would like to turn them out. Accordingly they are anti-Russian, too, and the Russians, Poles and Yugoslavs see the US Army building up a counter-revolutionary force in Germany which could endanger the peace of Central Europe. Mr. Danilell points out that our officers who did this had no sinister intentions; they merely saw American soldiers going home faster than replacements were coming in; so they enlisted anybody they could find to perform necessary guard duties in utter innocence of the political complications which their actions involved. Well, there are men in the War Dept. who know better, and it may be hoped that they will soon take

action to remove this particular cause of suspicion."

GERMAN ELECTION COMMENTS

Recent voting in Germany produced a wide range of analytical comment among the radio broadcasters. Some representative comments follow:

Cecil Brown (MBS): "Along with tasting democracy through an intimidation-free election, Germans are also complaining against the American administration. They insist this is a democratic right. Some observers believe Germans are really complaining because they no longer have an opportunity to rob, conquer and murder their neighbors. To perpetuate the practice, a widespread but unorganized underground exists in Germany. It can't act now, but when it does a concentrated force will be needed to put it down. If a resistance group gets entrenched somewhere, air power would be helpful in routing them out; but demobilization has hit so hard that we don't have the air strength to take care of a sudden current emergency and it would probably be weeks before anything could be done." H. R. Baukhage (ABC): "France and Britain both say too soon. The Germans aren't ripe for political independence." George Hicks (ABC): "Germans... are not desperately turning to the Russian orbit in revenge against the Western Allies, possibly because out of two ills they consider Russian dominance as worse."

MOBILE CONSTABULARY

"By next July, the US Army will have in operation a specially trained constabulary force of 38,000 men which will inaugurate an innovation in the control and policing of the occupation zone," according to Edwin Hartrich of the New York Herald Tribune.



"This new force represents a development which, perhaps unwittingly, is patterned after the defunct Nazi SS, as orig-

inally conceived, and the 'garde mobile' of France... The zone constabulary is the War Department's project to revive and strengthen the military control of an occupied people and to place it on a scientific plane with a relatively small force. "... It will 'lend support and assistance when and where needed to the law-enforcing agencies of the American Army and the German government.'"

"Special emphasis is being placed on the selection of men for the constabulary. Volunteers are preferred. Selectees must be five feet seven inches tall and over and in the best physical condition. German-speaking personnel will have a priority over others, though this is not a determining qualification".

OFFICIALS SEE "RED"

Along with a Representative or two, Ernie Adamson counsel for the House Committee on Un-American Activities, now concerned with investigating GI demonstrations, is reported by the Washington Post as suspecting Communists "agitated some of the soldiers." His exact remarks were: "We have evidence to show that Communist agitators went into the Army for the sole purpose of causing trouble." Of particular interest to the committee, he said, was the Frankfurt demonstration.

NO "RED" AGITATORS

War Department officials are reported by the New York Herald Tribune to have characterized troop rallies as largely spontaneous.... although subversive elements may have capitalized on the situation. It was not felt any one group organized them... but that a few agitators may have lent some inspiration.

TOP-FLIGHT EXECUTIVES WANTED

In spite of an acute need for top-flight civilian administrators, both in Germany and Japan, says The New York Times, the Government has been having trouble in recruiting the kind of men it needs and must have. Lack of "sufficient sentiment"

is cited as one reason why competent executives balk at going to Germany to take jobs, regardless of the personal sacrifice involved. A more pertinent reason seems to be that the "Government wants executives worthy of a salary of more than 25,000 dollars a year to go to work for salaries of not more than 10,000 dollars. Major General John Hildring, head of the War Department's Civil Affairs Division, said... current pressing needs called for about fifteen or twenty (top executives) in Germany."

WOMEN TO STAY

Another New York Herald Tribune story carried the announcement that the Wacs, Waves and Women Marines will be continued in peacetime. There will be no peacetime Spars. Ordinarily, these war-time organizations would have expired six months after the end of the emergency, "but high officials of the three services declared.... the women have done such a good war-time job that.... a nucleus.... will be kept."

"SOFT" PEACE ECHO

Alexander Uhl writes in PM that, "A new drive against the Potsdam Agreements to de-industrialize Germany is now getting under way with efforts in the Senate to hold a Congressional investigation of US policy on the treatment of the Germans..... right now the "soft" peace effort is being headed by Sen Capehard who had inserted into the Congressional Record Tuesday a violent diatribe against what he called certain 'cliques' in the US Occupation Force, charging them with deliberately trying to starve the German people.

THEY WANNA GET MARR'ED

According to a Washington Post story, "three former GIs who remained in Germany to be near the women they love sent a last-ditch appeal to President Truman for permission to marry German girls. Pleading for relaxation of non-fraternization rules which prohibit

military personnel — including civilian military government employees — from marrying Germans, they wrote Mr. Truman they represented hundreds of American soldiers and civilians who are pining to marry frauleins."

WE OWE GERMANY NOTHING

News that such industries as remain, after Germany's war potential has been destroyed and reparations are collected, will be put back



on their feet, leads a New York Times editorial to note — "We owe nothing to the Germans ... we owe it to ourselves

to prevent demoralization which would only increase our problem. (There are also these)... fundamental rights guaranteed to an enemy population under the Geneva Convention. (Additionally) ... we have nothing to gain by the German population through keeping it idle... help Europe.. to help itself... Germany is a part of Europe." As long as Germany remains idle and demoralized, it will remain also a source of infection and incipient headache for the world. Only through work can Germany redeem itself, "and help to work its way out of the ruins left by the war."

COMMON-SENSE MOVE

The Philadelphia Bulletin believes that, to free United States of a big relief problem, the Germans and Japs must be allowed to feed and clothe themselves. It calls "the revival in part of the textile industry ... a common-sense move ... Reporters (have said) the Soviets were doing more than the Western Powers to permit a revival of industry. Certainly no one will charge the Russians are over-tender." It's not a question of helping those countries regain former export markets, but with some raw materials, they "would be able to supply their minimum clothing needs."

Station List

Military Government Elements

UNIT	LOCATION	OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT	DIRECTOR OR COMMANDING OFFICER
UNITED STATES FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER			
Office of Mil Govt for Germany (U.S.) Berlin			Lt Gen Lueius D Clay
Office of Mil Govt (U.S. Zone) Frankfurt			Maj Gen C L Adcock

LAND WURTTENBERG-BADEN

Office of Mil Govt for Württemberg- Baden	Stuttgart		Col W W Dawson
1st Mil Govt Bn (Sep) (APO 758)			
Hq 1st Mil Govt Bn (Sep) Stuttgart			Col W W Dawson
Hq & Sv Co 1st Mil Govt Bn (Sep) Stuttgart			Lt Wm E Snodgrass
Mobile Maint Plat., Hq & Sv Co 1st Mil Govt Bn (Sep) Zuffenhausen			Capt E Thompson
Hq 1st Mil Govt Med Gp Stuttgart			

Württemberg

E-1	Stuttgart	Württemberg	Col W W Dawson
F-10	Stuttgart	SK Stuttgart	Maj R H Stimson
F-11	Ulm	SK-LK Ulm	Maj J Owen
G-20	Aalen	LK Aalen	Maj M Hoover
G-21	Böblingen	LK Böblingen	Capt W A Becker
G-22	Craillsheim	LK Craillsheim	Maj T Taylor
G-23	Esslingen	LK Esslingen	Lt Col J I Taylor
G-24	Gmünd	LK Gmünd	Capt J N Krajnak
G-25	Göppingen	LK Göppingen	Maj J A Holbrook
G-26	Schwäbisch Hall	LK Hall	Capt H A Wyatt
G-27	Heidenheim	LK Heidenheim	Maj B V Bloom
G-28	Heilbronn	LK Heilbronn	Maj M W Terry
G-29	Ludwigsburg	LK Ludwigsburg	Capt H K Mansou
G-30	Waiblingen	LK Waiblingen	Maj H W Freeman
H-50	Backnang	LK Backnang	Capt V J Manno
H-52	Künzelsau	LK Künzelsau	Capt W L Strauss
H-53	Leonberg	LK Leonberg	Capt R S Deetz
H-54	Bad Mergentheim	LK Mergentheim	Capt R Forrest
H-55	Nürtingen	LK Nürtingen	Maj S A Warren
H-56	Ohringen	LK Ohringen	1st Lt M Korsen
H-58	Vaihingen	LK Vaihingen	Capt J G Cox

Landesbezirk North Baden

Co E	Durlach	Landesbezirk	1st Lt H Oakes
E-7	Karlsruhe	North Baden	Col C Lisle
F-16	Mannheim	SK-LK Mannheim	Maj L L Lewis
G-43	Heidelberg	SK-LK Heidelberg	Lt Col I L Harlow
G-46	Pforzheim	SK-LK Pforzheim	1st Lt N Semaschko
G-47	Karlsruhe	SK-LK Karlsruhe	Maj W T Neel
H-87	Bruchsal	LK Bruchsal	Maj E V Le Blanc
H-89	Buchen	LK Buchen	Maj J A McGuinness
H-90	Mosbach	LK Mosbach	Capt W J Melchers
H-91	Tauberbischofsheim	LK Tauberbischofsheim	1st Lt J Zecca
H-92	Sinsheim	LK Sinsheim	Capt H D Peterson

LAND GREATER HESSE

Office of Mil Govt
for Land Greater Hesse
Wiesbaden

Col J R Newman

2d Mil Govt Bn (Sep)
(APO 75B)

Hq 2d Mil Gvt Bn (Sep) Wiesbaden
Hq Co 2d Mil Gvt Bn (Sep) Wiesbaden
Sv Co 2d Mil Gvt Bn (Sep) Oberursel

Col J R Newman
1st Lt K M Burke
Capt B Sturdevan

Regierungsbezirk Wiesbaden

E-5 Wiesbaden
E-6 Frankfurt
F-15 Wiesbaden
G-41 Wetzlar
H-77 Dillenburg

H-78 Gelnhausen

H-79 Hanau
H-80 Weilburg

H-81 Hofheim
H-83 Rudesheim

H-86 Bad Homburg

RB Wiesbaden
SK Frankfurt
SK Wiesbaden
LK Wetzlar
LK Dillkreis &
LK Biedenkopf
LK Gelnhausen &
LK Schlüchtern
SK-LK Hanau
LK Limburg &
LK Oberlahn
LK Maintaunus
LK Rheingau &
LK Untertaunus
LK Usingen &
LK Obertaunus

Col J R Newman
Lt Col F E Sheehan
Lt Col F A Sansome
Maj M Baymen

Maj D B Bernstein

Capt W F Johnston
Maj T Turner Jr

1st Lt H L Edburg
Capt J C Nelson

Maj J G Gavin
Capt O Kuntzleman

Regierungsbezirk Kassel

Co C Kirchhain
E-4 Kassel
F-14 Kassel

G-38 Fritzlar

G-39 Marburg
G-40 Fulda
G-4B Korbach
H-65 Eschwege

H-67 Hersfeld

H-68 Hofgeismar

ML-1 (Sp) Kassel

RB Kassel
RB Kassel
SK-LK Kassel &
LK Melsungen
LK Fritzlar-Homburg &
LK Ziegenhain
SK-LK Marburg
SK-LK Fulda & LK Hünfeld
LK Waldeck & LK Frankenberg
LK Eschwege &
LK Witzenhausen
LK Hersfeld &
LK Rotenburg
LK Hofgeismar &
LK Wolfhagen
Liaison

1st Lt J F Owen
Lt Col A Skarry

Lt Col R Bard

Capt G De Nubla
Maj L S Williams
Maj C F Russe
Capt H R Dichtenmueller

Capt W B Getmann

Capt R W Godwin

Capt S B Borda
1st Lt M Rogin

Regierungsbezirk Hessen

E-3 Darmstadt
F-12 Darmstadt

F-13 Offenbach
G-31 Bensheim
G-32 Bidingen
G-33 Dieburg
G-34 Friedberg
G-35 Giessen
H-62 Lauterbach
DP-20 Darmstadt

RB Hessen
SK-LK Darmstadt &
LK Gross Gerau
SK-LK Offenbach
LK Bergstrasse & LK Erbach
LK Bidingen
LK Dieburg
LK Friedberg
SK-LK Giessen
LK Lauterbach & LK Alsfield

Lt Col R W Copeland
Lt Col L G Kelly

Capt E J Emerick
Maj A C Leggatt
1st Lt T A Norris
Capt J M Nutt Jr
Maj R J Willard
Maj D M Easterday
Capt H Nickelsberg
1st Lt A J Peyser

LAND BAVARIA

Office of
Mil Govt for
Bavaria Munich

Brig Gen W J Muller

3d Mil Govt Regt
(APO 403)

Hq 3d Mil Govt München
Hq Co München
Sv Co München
R & T Co München
3d MG Med Det Munich
3d MG Med Sec München

Col C C Morgan
Capt J W Preston
Maj A S Keller
2nd Lt W T Lyons
Lt Col E R Jenney
Maj M J Kanner

Regierungsbezirk Mainfranken

Co A	Ochsenfurt	RB Mainfranken
E-202	Würzburg	SK-LK Würzburg
F-210	Würzburg	SK-LK Aschaffenburg
G-220	Aschaffenburg	SK-LK Schweinfurt
G-221	Schweinfurt	LK Kissingen
H-250	Bad Kissingen	LK Kitzingen
H-251	Kitzingen	LK Alzenau
I-330	Alzenau	LK Brückenu
I-331	Brückenu	LK Ebern
I-332	Ebern	LK Gemünden
I-333	Gemünden	LK Gerolzhofen
I-334	Gerolzhofen	LK Hammelsburg
I-335	Hammelsburg	LK Hassfurt
I-336	Hassfurt	LK Hofheim
I-337	Hofheim	LK Karlstadt
I-338	Karlstadt	LK Königshofen
I-339	Königshofen	LK Lohr
I-340	Lohr	LK Marktheidenfeld
I-341	Marktheidenfeld	LK Mellrichstadt
I-342	Mellrichstadt	LK Miltenberg
I-343	Miltenberg	LK Neustadt a. d. Saale
I-344	Neustadt Saale	LK Obernburg
I-345	Obernburg	LK Ochsenfurt
I-346	Ochsenfurt	

1st Lt R E Handwerk
Lt Col M E Henderson
Lt Col J B Bradford
Maj C M Emerick
Lt Col J B Thomson
Capt M A Potter
Capt L A Mercadante
Capt K L Ellis
Maj H P Clark Jr
Capt R W Jonea
Capt J J Widmann
Capt J M Simon
Maj E G Emery
Capt J R Ellis Jr
Capt E F Smith
Capt W E Brayden
Capt L F Girolani
Capt Elmer E Kelly
Maj M B Voorhees
Lt L K Owens
Capt D J Huffman
Capt E F Warnke
Maj B H Logan
Capt J R Crain

Regierungsbezirk Ober & Mittelfranken

Co C	Ansbach	RB Ober and Mittelfranken
E-203	Ansbach	SK-LK Nürnberg
F-211	Nürnberg	SK-LK Ansbach
G-228	Ansbach	SK-LK Fürth
G-229	Fürth	LK Dinkelsbühl
H-261	Dinkelsbühl	LK Eichstadt
H-262	Eichstadt	LK Feuchtwangen
H-263	Feuchtwangen	LK Gunzenhausen
H-264	Gunzenhausen	LK Hersbruck
H-265	Hersbruck	LK Hilpoltstein
H-266	Hilpoltstein	LK Weissenburg
H-267	Weissenburg	LK Rothenburg
H-268	Rothenburg	LK Schwabach
H-269	Schwabach	LK Scheinfeld
H-270	Scheinfeld	LK Uffenheim
H-271	Uffenheim	LK Lauf
H-272	Lauf	LK Neustadt a. d. Aisch
H-273	Neustadt a. d. Aisch	
Co B	Bamberg	
G-222	Bamberg	SK-LK Bamberg
G-223	Bayreuth	SK-LK Bayreuth

Capt G N Hultzen
Col E M Haight
Lt Col C Klise
Lt Col W R Whitaker Jr
Maj J D Cofer
Lt Col J W Hall
Maj W T Stoats
1st Lt L D Smith
Maj H W Zurn
Maj H R Glaser
Maj H T Lund
Capt J J Carr
Maj R C Anderson
Maj R E Stringer
Maj H C Kauffmann
Maj E I Paul
Maj E N Humphrey
Maj F K Hinchey
2nd Lt B Lyons
Maj H L Woodall
Lt Col C J Reilly

UNIT	LOCATION	OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT	DIRECTOR OR COMMANDING OFFICER
G-224	Erlangen	LK Erlangen	Lt Col F Robie
G-225	Coburg	SK-LK Coburg	Maj S Klein
G-226	Kronach	LK Kronach	Capt J F Begley
G-227	Hof	SK-LK Hof	Maj B P White
G-247	Lichtenfels	LK Lichtenfels	Lt Col J R Case
H-252	Ebermannstadt	LK Ebermannstadt	Capt J J Bianchi
H-253	Hochstadt	LK Hochstadt a. d. Aisch	Maj R G Hanford
H-254	Kulmbach	LK Kulmbach	Lt Col P B Lamson
H-255	Pegnitz	LK Pegnitz	Maj M F Skinner
H-256	Munchberg	LK Munchberg	Maj A C Abbott
H-258	Rehau	LK Rehau	Maj R H Dodds
H-259	Wunseidel	LK Wunseidel	Maj D H Alexander
H-260	Forchheim	LK Forchheim	Maj R J Nelson
I-347	Naila	LK Naila	1st Lt W P Morris
I-348	Stadtsteinach	LK Stadtsteinach	1st Lt H F Casademont

Regierungsbezirk Niederbayern & Oberpfalz

Co H	Regensburg	RB Niederbayern & Oberpfalz	1st Lt W S Mather
E-204	Regensburg	SK-LK Regensburg	Lt Col G D Hastings
F-212	Regensburg	SK Weiden &	Maj C G Doyle
G-230	Weiden	LK Neustadt a. d. Wald	Maj J C Robertson Jr
G-244	Amberg	SK-LK Amberg	Maj J H Mattox
H-247	Cham	LK Cham	Capt L S Gagliardi
H-275	Burglengenfeld	LK Burglengenfeld	Capt E Fichter
H-276	Parsberg	LK Parsberg	Capt R E Boyd
H-277	Tirschenreuth	LK Tirschenreuth	Maj F P Murray
II-278	Neunburg	LK Neunburg vorm Wald	Capt S P Himic
H-279	Eschenbach	LK Eschenbach i. d. Opf.	Capt W R Baylies
I-349	Kemnath	LK Kemnath	1st Lt T E McGee
I-350	Nabburg	LK Nabburg	Capt F N Shanbacher
I-351	Oberviechtach	LK Oberviechtach	Capt R A Berry
I-352	Riedenberg	LK Riedenberg	Capt B J Tutuska
I-353	Vohenstrauß	LK Vohenstrauß	Capt S Lesneski
I-354	Roding	LK Roding	Capt C R Bucheit
I-355	Waldmünchen	LK Waldmünchen	Capt R D Canover
I-356	Beilngries	LK Beilngries	1st Lt L C Johnstone
I-357	Neumarkt	LK Neumarkt i. d. Opf.	Capt W N Blanton
I-358	Sulzbach-Rosenburg	LK Sulzbach-Rosenburg	Capt A J Dunn
G-243	Passau	SK-LK Passau	Maj W Wickersham
G-245	Landshut	SK-LK Landshut	Maj H J Mrachek
G-246	Straubing	SK-LK Straubing	Maj H T Olsen
H-301	Deggendorf	LK Deggendorf	1st Lt O A Childs
H-302	Eggenfelden	LK Eggenfelden	Maj E W Manning
H-303	Grafenau	LK Grafenau	Capt S Perlman
H-304	Kelheim	LK Kelheim	Capt C T Hutson
H-305	Landau	LK Landau a. d. Isar	Capt G C McCall
H-306	Pfarrkirchen	LK Pfarrkirchen	Capt W D Baird
H-307	Zweisel	LK Regen	Capt A R Sphar
H-308	Vilshofen	LK Vilshofen	Capt W J Fitzpatrick
H-309	Vilsbiburg	LK Vilsbiburg	Capt F Harris
H-310	Freyung	LK Wolfstein	Capt R W Douglass
I-375	Bogen	LK Bogen	Capt A G Albert
I-377	Dingolfing	LK Dingolfing	Capt E M Martocci
I-378	Griesbach	LK Griesbach	Capt A S Gallant
I-379	Kötzting	LK Kötzting	Capt J W Fleishman
I-380	Mainburg	LK Mainburg	Capt J W Leidy
I-381	Mallersdorf	LK Mallersdorf	Capt C N Ahlstrom
I-382	Rottenburg	LK Rottenburg	1st Lt E A Russo
I-383	Viechtach	LK Viechtach	Capt A L Corcelius
I-385	Wegscheid	LK Wegscheid	Capt H Walter

Regierungsbezirk Oberbayern

Co F	Munich	RB Oberbayern	1st Lt W M Ellis
E-205	Munich	SK-LK Munich	Lt Col R F Brooks
F-213	Munich	LK Garmisch-Partenkirchen	Lt Col E Keller Jr
G-236	Partenkirchen		Lt Col C H Heyl

UNIT	LOCATION	OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT	DIRECTOR OR COMMANDING OFFICER
G-237	Ingolstadt	SK-LK Ingolstadt	Maj L H Norins
G-238	Munich	LK Munich	Maj M T Mawrence
H-286	Fürstenfeldbruck	LK Fürstenfeldbruck	Capt J J McBride
H-287	Landsberg	LK Landsberg	Capt M L Matt
H-288	Pfaffenhofen	LK Pfaffenhofen	Capt J E Thayer
H-289	Starnberg	LK Starnberg	Maj M W Nitz
H-290	Weilheim	LK Weilheim	Capt R J O'Dowd
H-291	Wolftrathausen	LK Wolftrathausen	Maj P L Steers
I-362	Aichach	LK Aichach	Capt L R Day
I-364	Schrobenhausen	LK Schrobenhausen	1st Lt R C Wiggins
I-367	Dachau	LK Dachau	Capt V A Burke
I-368	Schöngau	LK Schöngau	Maj C A Rein
Co E	Wasserburg		Capt D E Brown
C-231	Freising	LK Freising	Maj E Boney
G-232	Miesbach	LK Miesbach	Lt Col J Kelly
G-233	Traunstein	LK Traunstein	Maj C J Bischoff
G-234	Altötting	LK Altötting	Maj R L Montague
C-235	Rosenheim	SK-LK Rosenheim	Capt R H Nece
H-280	Erding	LK Erding	Maj C C Brown
H-281	Laufen	LK Laufen	1st Lt D L Price
H-282	Mühldorf	LK Mühldorf	Capt W M Forys
H-283	Wasserburg	LK Wasserburg	1st Lt A L Klinger
H-284	Bad Tölz	LK Tölz	Capt V Thom
H-285	Aibling	LK Aibling	Maj E J Newmeyer
H-311	Berchtesgaden	LK Berchtesgaden	Capt W Caruso
I-361	Ebersberg	LK Ebersberg	1st Lt C C Smith Jr

Regierungsbezirk Schwaben

Co G	Ziemetshausen		Capt O Meirhenry
E-206	Augsburg	RB Schwaben	Lt Col C M Avery
F-214	Augsburg	SK-LK Augsburg	Lt Col R A Norton
G-239	Dillingen	LK Dillingen	Maj Darragh
G-240	Weissenborn	LK Neu Ulm	Capt J M Latimer
G-241	Sonthofen	LK Sonthofen	Maj J E Rhea
G-242	Kempten	SK-LK Kempten	Capt B M Ziegler
H-292	Donauwörth	LK Donauwörth	Capt L A Proper
H-293	Günzburg	LK Günzburg	Capt M Clossop
H-294	Markt Oberdorf	LK Markt Oberdorf	Capt B M Green
H-295	Memmingen	LK Memmingen	Maj R F Wagner
H-296	Mindelheim	LK Mindelheim	Maj E C Bunker
H-297	Neuburg	LK Neuburg a. d. Donau	Capt H E Reeves
H-298	Nördlingen	LK Nördlingen	Capt S H Brown
H-299	Füssen	LK Füssen	Capt S D Lubin
H-300	Krumbach	LK Krumbach	Capt C E Witney
I-369	Illertissen	LK Illertissen	Capt F E Kettunen
I-370	Kaufbeuren	LK Kaufbeuren	1st Lt R E Lee
I-372	Wertingen	LK Wertingen	2nd Lt W A Graham
I-373	Friedberg	LK Friedberg	Capt L Sims
I-374	Schwabmünchen	LK Schwabmünchen	Capt L E Smith Jr

U. S. SECTOR, BERLIN DISTRICT

Office of Mil Govt (U. S. Sector Berlin)	Berlin	U. S. Sector, Berlin District (APO 755)	Col F L Howley
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BREMEN PORT COMAND (APO 751)

Office of Mil Govt (Bremen Port Command)	Bremen	Bremen Port Command	Lt Col C H Scott
Office of Mil Govt for Bremen	Bremen	SK Bremen	Lt Col J M Shamel
Office of Mil Govt for Wesermünde	Wesermünde	SK Wesermünde	Lt Col L S Diggs